San Francisco's Board of Supervisors voted 8-3 last Tuesday to commission an independent audit of the city's crime data collection systems, a decision that crystallized years of frustration among researchers, neighborhood advocates, and law enforcement officials who argue the city has been making billion-dollar public safety decisions largely in the dark.
The timing matters. The city enters the back half of 2026 with a Police Department that shed roughly 400 sworn officers between 2020 and 2024 through attrition and hiring freezes, a fentanyl crisis that remade the Tenderloin and SoMa into open-air emergency zones, and a mayor's office still recalibrating after the political turbulence of the Breed era. The question isn't simply whether crime is up or down — the SFPD's own CompStat figures show overall Part 1 crimes dropped 11 percent in 2025 compared to 2023 — but whether anyone can trust the numbers being used to steer policy.
The Data Gap That Built Up Over Years
The roots of the current mess go back at least to 2019, when the city's Department of Emergency Management migrated to a new computer-aided dispatch system that, for nearly 18 months, generated incident classifications that analysts at the Budget and Legislative Analyst's Office later found were inconsistent with prior methodology. That gap made year-over-year comparisons unreliable across a stretch of time that happened to include the pandemic, the George Floyd protests, and a wave of organized retail theft that hit Union Square merchants hard enough to push Nordstrom and Anthropologie out of the neighborhood by 2023.
The San Francisco Controller's Office flagged the classification inconsistencies in a March 2022 memo, but the memo circulated internally and did not prompt a public correction. Researchers at the University of California Hastings College of the Law — now UC College of the Law San Francisco, located on McAllister Street — who were building a crime mapping tool for the Mission District found the discrepancy independently the following year and published a working paper in September 2023 that got almost no political traction at the time.
Meanwhile, the city was spending. The Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing budgeted $672 million for fiscal year 2024-25, a significant share of which went to interventions in the Civic Center corridor and the UN Plaza area that doubled as de facto crime-reduction strategies. The SFPD's budget for the same year was $714 million. Neither department had a shared outcome metric that could tell a supervisor on the Budget Committee whether those dollars were interacting in any coherent way.
What Reform Actually Looks Like From Here
The audit approved last Tuesday will be conducted by the Controller's Office working alongside the Board's Budget and Legislative Analyst team, with a final report due by February 1, 2027. The scope includes a review of how incidents are coded at the dispatch level, how the SFPD maps reports to FBI Uniform Crime Reporting categories, and whether neighborhood-level data is being shared in usable form with the roughly two dozen community-based organizations — including Tenderloin Housing Clinic and Safer SF Without Policing — that currently run their own informal tracking spreadsheets because they don't trust the official feed.
District 6 Supervisor's office staff, who cover the Tenderloin and SoMa, have been pushing for a real-time public dashboard modeled loosely on what Los Angeles launched through its Angeleno Connect platform in 2024. A pilot version built on Salesforce infrastructure is reportedly in late-stage procurement review at the city's Department of Technology, with a projected cost of $2.3 million for the first 18 months.
None of this happens fast. The audit alone will take at least seven months. In the meantime, the SFPD's Tenderloin Station on Eddy Street, the epicenter of the fentanyl enforcement surge that began under Mayor Breed's 2023 emergency declaration, continues to generate its own weekly incident summaries that residents access through a Nextdoor feed — a patchwork solution that captures exactly the absurdity critics have been describing for years. Good data doesn't fix crime. But making decisions without it has a documented cost, and San Francisco has been paying it for a while.